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I. Introduction 
The major 1969 corporate law developments of particular 
interest to the California practitioner were: (1) California 
appellate decisions which, at least by implication, greatly 
broaden the scope of a controlling shareholder's duty to minor-
ity shareholders; (2) amendments to the California Corpo-
rations Code; and (3) amendments to the Delaware General 
Corporation Law. 
In Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co./ the California Supreme 
Court declared that majority shareholders must adhere to a 
standard of good faith and inherent fairness to minority 
shareholders in transactions where control of the corporation 
is material. In Brown v. Halbert,2 the Court of Appeal spoke 
of a "fiduciary relationship" between the dominant stock-
holder and the minority stockholders even in the absence of 
"special facts." 
There were several amendments to the California Corpora-
tions Code in 1969, the most important of which concern 
1. 1 Ca1.3d 93, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 2. 271 Cal. App.2d 252, 76 Cal. 
460 P.2d 464 (1969). Rptr. 781 (1969). 
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expanded corporate information filings with the Secretary 
of State and increased flexibility in determining accounting 
treatment of certain transactions.3 
In response to the desires of corporate management as re-
flected by the efforts of the corporate bar, extensive changes 
were made in the Delaware General Corporation Law in 1969, 
carrying further Delaware's pro-management orientation vis-a-
vis stockholders and creditors; much of this legislation was 
also in furtherance of the goal of minimizing formality. Al-
though this publication is concerned primarily with trends and 
developments in California law, Delaware corporation law is 
of great importance to the California bar. Most California 
attorneys have clients that are, should be, or may in the future 
be incorporated under Delaware law, or clients that may ac-
quire or be acquired by Delaware corporations, or clients that 
may become stockholders or creditors of Delaware corpora-
tions.4 
3. The extensive revision of Califor-
nia's "blue sky" law, which became 
effective January 2, 1969, was enacted 
during 1968. See Bader, BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS, Cal Law-Trends and 
Developments 1969, p. 139. 
4. As a result of Delaware's liberal 
statute, its extensive and rather 
sophisticated judicial development of 
corporation law and its sympathetic 
attitude towards business corporations, 
"Delaware became and remains the 
most popular state in which to incor-
porate any interstate company of sub-
stantial size." Cary, Cases and Mate-
rials on Corporations 9 (4th ed. 1969). 
See generally, Israeis, Corporate Prac-
tice, pp. 159-160 (2d ed. 1969), and 
Rohrlich, Organizing Corporate and 
Other Business Enterprises Ch. VI (4th 
ed. 1967). Some of the key features 
of Delaware law that make it attrac-
tive have been described as follows: 
In addition to lower capital stock or 
franchise taxes in Delaware, other 
advantages which induce corporate 
CAL LAW 1970 
managements to seek incorporation in 
Delaware include: greater freedom to 
pay dividends and make distributions; 
greater ease of charter amendment and 
less restrictions upon selling assets, 
mortgaging, leasing, and merging, due 
to the lower percentage of shareholder 
approval required and also by virtue 
of lesser rights of appraisal for dis-
senting minority shareholders; freedom 
from mandatory cumulative voting; 
permission to have staggered boards 
of directors; lesser pre-emptive rights 
for shareholders; clearer rights of in-
demnification for directors and officers; 
greater freedom of action in many 
crucial respects for management; and 
a climate of opinion, thought to be 
prevalent in the legislature and courts, 
generally favorable to management and 
generally unreceptive to the dissident 
minority shareholder. Kaplan, Foreign 
Corporations and Local -Corporate 
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II. Judicial Development of Protection of Minority Share-
holders 
The need for protection of minority shareholders, particu-
larly in connection with the disposition of controlling stock 
interests, has been the subject of much scholarly analysis.6 
Brown v. Halbert,6 decided by the Court of Appeal on March 
28, 1969, and Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & CO.,7 decided by 
the Supreme Court on November 7, 1969,8 held that a require-
ment of fairness to the minority exists in transactions where 
control of the corporation is material. 
The so-called "traditional" or "majority" approach holds 
that a controlling shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to the cor-
poration but not to minority shareholders, and that the sale 
of contro19 at a premium is permissible provided that the sale 
5. See, e.g., Andrews, The Stock-
holder's Right to Equal Opportunity 
in the Sale of Shares, 78 Harv. L. 
Rev. 505 (1965); Javaras, Equal Op-
portunity in the Sale of Controlling 
Shares: A Reply to Professor 
Andrews, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 420 
(1965); Berle, The Price of Power: 
Sale of Corporate Control, 50 Cornell 
L.Q. 628 (1965); Jennings, Trading in 
Corporate Control, 44 Cal. L. Rev. 1 
(1956); Eisenberg, The Legal Role of 
Shareholders and Management in 
Modern Corporation Decision Making, 
57 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1969); and Bayne, 
The Sale-of-Control Premium: The 
Intrinsic Illegitimacy, 47 Texas L. Rev. 
215 (1969). 
6. 271 Cal. App.2d 252, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 781 (1969); original opinion 
modified, April 25, 1969 (see 271 ACA 
881 ). 
7. 1 Ca1.3d 93, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 
460 P.2d 464 (1969). 
8. Opinion modified on denial of 
rehearing, December 10, 1969. 
9. With regard to the meaning of 
"control" in this context, see the 
Andrews and Jennings articles cited at 
168 
note 5 above. In both the Jones and 
Brown cases, the defendants owned and 
dealt with stock interests greater than 
50%. It remains to be seen how the 
doctrine enunciated in those cases will 
be applied to transactions in shares 
aggregating less than 50% but still 
constituting "control" for various pur-
poses. See, e.g., Essex Universal Corp. 
v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 13 ALR3d 
346 (2d Cir., 1962) where, on remand, 
the District Judge would be required 
to make a finding that there was a 
"practical certainty" that the purchaser 
of the 30% block could indeed elect a 
majority of the board in order to hold 
valid a clause in the transfer agreement 
requiring the resignation of directors. 
See also Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. 
Div.2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1964), 
afJ'd 14 N.Y.2d 877 (1964), 249 N.Y.S. 
2d 877, 198 N.E.2d 908 (owner of 3% 
stock interest agreed to have seven 
directors resign seriatim; court voided 
election, holding that corporate man-
agement is not a subject of trade and 
cannot be bought apart from actual 
stock control, but stating that "where 
there has been a transfer of a majority 
of stock, or even such a percentage 
CAL LAW 1970 
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does not result in injury to the corporation and does not in-
volve an unlawful sale of corporate office. Injury to the 
corporation has been found where the controlling shareholder 
fraudulently or negligently transfers control to purchasers 
who subsequently mismanage or loot the corporation.10 Also, 
liability has been imposed where the seller induced the pur-
chaser to buy the controlling shares rather than the corporate 
assets sought by the purchaser, thus diverting to himself a 
corporate opportunity.l1 In other jurisdictions, the so-called 
"special facts" doctrine was adopted to permit minority share-
holders to obtain a portion of the premium or to recover 
damages in certain situations where the transfer of control 
did not result in injury to the corporation but there was in-
equitable conduct on the part of the controlling shareholder. 
Modern California cases12 have applied the "special facts" 
doctrine, although older cases contain language asserting the 
"traditional" approach.13 In American Trust Co. v. California 
Western States Life Insurance Co.,l4 the Supreme Court ana-
lyzed these earlier cases, stating that such language was 
dicta, and observed that "the question is still open in this 
state as to whether we shall follow the majority rule, the 
majority rule as modified by the 'special facts' doctrine, or 
the minority rule; . . . ."15 In Taylor v. Wright/6 Justice 
Peters predicted that the Supreme Court would "adopt either 
the 'special facts' doctrine or the minority rule."17 
as gives working control, a change of 
directors by resignation and filled 
vacancies is proper." (246 N.Y.S.2d 
913, 950). 
10. See, e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 
N.Y.S.2d 622 (1941); Insuranshares 
Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. 
Supp. 22 (E.D., Pa. 1940). 
11. See, e.g., Dunnett v. Am, 71 F. 
2d 912 (10th Cir., 1934); American 
Trust Co. v. California Western States 
Life Insurance Co., 15 Cal.2d 42, 98 
P.2d 497 (1940); Commonwealth Title 
Insurance & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 
Pa. 410, 76 A. 77 (1910); but see 
CAL LAW 1970 
Tryon v. Smith, 191 Ore. 172, 229 P .2d 
251 (1951). 
12. E.g., Low v. Wheeler, 207 Cal. 
App.2d 477, 24 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1962). 
13. E.g., Ryder v. Bamberger, 172 
Cal. 791, 158 P. 753 (1916). 
14. 15 Cal.2d 42, 98 P.2d 497 
(1940). 
15. 15 Cal.2d 42, 61, 98 P.2d 497, 
507 (1940). 
16. 69 Cal. App.2d 371, 159 P.2d 
980 (1945). 
17. 69 Cal. App.2d 371, 382, 159 
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Against this background, let us examine the Brown and 
Jones cases. 
In Brown v. Halbert,18 four minority stockholders brought 
a class action19 seeking, inter alia, to impose a trust on a 
portion of the funds the defendants realized from the sale of 
their majority stock interest in the Tulare Savings & Loan 
Association.20 
Halbert, president, chairman of the board and dominant 
stockholder of the association, was approached by a prospec-
tive purchaser and asked if the association was for sale. Hal-
bert replied that it was not, but that he and his wife would 
consider selling their shares (53% of the outstanding stock) 
at 2-1/2 times book value. The association's board of direc-
tors and the other stockholders were apparently never con-
sulted as to the offer to buy the association. Subsequently, 
the Halberts entered into an agreement to sell their stock for 
2-1/2 times book value, or $1,548.05 per share. The agree-
ment provided, among other things, that the buyer could 
inspect the books of the association; that, contrary to past 
practice, no dividends were to be paid during the period of 
escrow; and that, upon the close of escrow, the selling stock-
holders would submit resignations as officers and directors 
and hold such meetings as might be requested by the buyer. 
The minority stockholders were not informed of the transac-
tion until after it had been negotiated. 
18. 271 Cal. App.2d 252, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 781 (1969). 
19. The complaint named four de-
fendants, of whom only Edward Halbert 
was claimed to be the principal viola-
tor of fiduciary duties. The three 
other defendants "are charged with ac-
countability for their acquiescence in 
his actions and by reason of their 
acceptance of the benefits." (271 Cal. 
App.2d 252, 253, n. 1,76 Cal. Rptr. 781, 
782 (1969). The other defendants were 
Halbert's wife; R. Morris, who was 
secretary-treasurer, a director and 
second in command of the operation 
170 
of the association, and who was re-
tained as the manager by the pur-
chaser; and Robert Tienken. The 
opinion does not tell of any connec-
tion between Tienken and either Hal-
bert or the association. 
20. After the judgment for the 
defendants was reversed on appeal, the 
parties reached a settlement agreement 
providing for liability in the amount 
of $175,000. (See Crocker, Brown v. 
Halbert-One Small Step for Stock-
holder Equal Opportunity, 45 L.A. 
Bar. Bull. 57 at 80 (1969).) 
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Upon completion of the purchase of Halbert's stock, the 
buyer indicated its desire to acquire the stock of the minority 
stockholders at $300 per share. Halbert, while still president 
and chairman of the board, assisted the buyer by pressuring 
the minority stockholders to sell their shares at that price, 
telling them that dividends would not be paid for a number 
of years and that the stock would not be worth much. All 
but a few minority stockholders sold their stock at prices 
ranging between $300 and $650 per share. 
The Court of Appeal reviewed the authorities and stated 
that the more recent California cases have followed the "spe-
cial facts" doctrine. It decided, however, that the "special 
facts" doctrine should not be applied where the "majority 
stockholder-director sells the controlling block of stock to 
outside purchasers and by doing so causes the minority stock 
to be devaluated,"! holding that in his capacity as president, 
chairman of the board and dominant stockholder, Halbert 
stood in a fiduciary relationship to both the corporation and 
the minority stockholders. The burden of proof, the court 
stated, was on Halbert to show that he had not breached his 
duty in securing a return for his stock higher than that re-
ceived by the minority stockholders for theirs. In discussing 
this fiduciary duty, the court stated that: 
Every sale of a block of control stock should not per se 
be subject to attack, but where the amount received by 
the majority stockholder-director seller is so dispropor-
tionate to the price available to the minority stockholders, ' 
then such fiduciary-seller must show that no advantage 
was taken if the sale is questioned.2 
Here, Halbert not only failed to make any effort to obtain 
for the minority the same price that he received, but he used 
his position to actively assist the buyer to acquire the minor-
ity stock at a lower price. The court cited a number of com-
mentators and concluded that: 
1. 271 Cal. App.2d 252, 264, 76 Cal. 2. 271 Cal. App.2d 252, 268, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 781, 788 (1969), Rptr. 781, 791 (1969), 
CAL. L.AW 1970 171 
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The rule we have adopted here simply is that it is the 
duty of the majority stockholder-director, when contem-
plating the sale of the majority stock at a price not avail-
able to other stockholders and which sale may prejudice 
the minority stockholders, is [sic] to act affirmatively 
and openly with full disclosure so that every opportunity 
is given to obtain substantially the same advantages 
that such fiduciary secured and for the full protection 
of the minority.3 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Draper stated that the 
Brown case "seems to me to fall within the rule of Low v. 
Wheeler [citation omitted], or, at most to require but a moder-
ate and reasonable extension of that rule. Hence I would 
base the decision upon the special facts doctrine as applied 
in Low.,,4 
The complex facts of Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co." are 
summarized as follows: In May, 1959,85% of the outstand-
ing stock of United Savings and Loan Association was owned 
by H. F. Ahmanson & Co. and certain relatives and busi-
ness associates of H. F. Ahmanson. The remaining 15% 
was owned by some four hundred persons, including the plain-
tiff. The Ahmanson group organized a holding company, 
United Financial Corporation of California, and exchanged 
their shares in the Association for shares of United.6 In 1960, 
United issued stock and convertible debentures to the pub-
lic; of the $7,200,000 proceeds, $6,200,000 was distributed 
as a return of capital to the original United stockholders. 
The accompanying prospectus noted that dividends from the 
Association would be utilized if the direct earnings of the 
holding company were insufficient to meet the obligations un-
der the debentures.7 In February, 1961, another public 
3. 271 Cal. App.2d 252, 272, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 781, 793-794 (1969). 
4. 271 Cal. App.2d 252, 273-274, 76 
Cal. Rptr. 781, 795 (1969). 
5. 1 Ca1.3d 93, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 
460 P.2d 464 (1969). 
172 
6. In addition to the Association 
stock, United also owned three insur-
ance agencies and stock in a fourth. 
7. In addition, the representations 
of United to the Corporations Com-
missioner (according to plaintiff's al-
legations) asserted that the financial 
CAL LAW 1970 
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offering was made by United, accompanied by a secondary 
offering by the original investors, at an aggregate offering 
price of $15,275,000. This created a public market for 
United stock and, incident thereto, substantially precluded 
the creation of a public market for the Association stock. In 
September, 1960, when the book value of the Association 
stock was $1,411.57 per share, United (then the owner of 
87.3% of the Association stock) offered to purchase some 
of the minority shares for $1,100 per share. In December, 
1960, the president of the Association, who was at that time 
a director of both United and the Association, contacted the 
remaining minority shareholders of the Association and ad-
vised them that there would be no dividends paid on the 
Association stock in the near future except the regular annual 
$4 per share dividend. In May, 1961, the minority share-
holders were offered United shares worth approximately $2,-
400 for each Association share. By way of contrast, the value 
in August, 1961, of the United 'shares received by defendants 
for each Association share exchanged by them in the forma-
tion of the holding company had risen to approximately 
$8,800, and during 1960-1961 had sold for as much as 
$13,127.41. In 1962, the Association paid an extra dividend 
of $84 per share. 
The defendants in the case were United, fifteen individuals 
and four corporations, all of whom were present or former 
shareholders or officers of the Association and all but one of 
whom incorporated United. Judgment was rendered for de-
fendants after an order sustaining demurrers, and the case on 
appeal was presented on the pleadings supplemented by stipu-
lated facts. 
The Supreme Court dealt first with the contention that 
plaintiff lacked capacity to sue on the theory that any injury 
suffered by plaintiff was common to all minority shaff~ilOlders 
of the Association and, therefore, that any cause of action 
reserves for debenture repayment 
required by the Commissioner's rules 
would be satisfied by having United 
exercise its control to cause the As-
CAL LAW 1970 
sociation to liquidate or encumber its 
income-producing assets and then cause 
the Association to distribute the cash 
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was derivative in nature.s Rejecting this contention, the Court 
held that plaintiff did not seek to recover on behalf of the cor-
poration for injury done to the corporation and that the 
gravamen of her cause of action was injury directly to her 
and the other minority shareholders. "The individual wrong 
necessary to support a suit by a shareholder need not be 
unique to that plaintiff . . . . If the injury is not incidental 
to an injury to the corporation, an individual cause of action 
exists."9 
Plaintiff claimed to represent "all of that portion of the 
other minority stockholders who are similarly situated who 
wish to rely thereon and who agree to compensate plaintiff 
and her attorneys for reasonable attorneys' fees in an amount 
to be determined by the court after trial. "10 The Court held 
that this was not an allegation of a class composed simply of 
persons who agreed with plaintiff but that the class designated 
consisted of the minority shareholders of the Association, 
i.e., those who held Association stock after the defendants ex-
changed their shares for United shares. The language con-
cerning agreement to share in the litigation expenses "does 
no more than state the applicable rule with regard to equitable 
apportionment of the litigation expenses incurred by a plain-
tiff who successfully prosecutes an action on behalf of a 
c1ass."l1 The Court held that the requisite community of 
interest (;xisted among the minority shareholders and that 
the class was readily ascertainable.12 
The Court then turned to the heart of the case in a portion 
of the opinion captioned "Majority Shareholders' Fiduciary 
Responsibility." The Court rejected the position that share-
holders owe no fiduciary obligation to other shareholders 
"absent reliance on inside information, use of corporate as-
8. Set Cal. Fin. Code § 7616. 
9. I Ca1.3c1 93, 107, 81 Cal. Rptr. 
592, 599, 460 P.2d 464, 471 (1969). 
10. 1 Ca1.3d 93, 120, 81 ral. Rptr. 
592, 608, 460 P.2d 464, 480 (1969), 
11. 1 Ca1.3d 93, 120, 81 Cal. Rptr. 
592, 608, 460 P.2d 464, 480 (1969). 
174 
12. In the Brown case, the court 
stated that the action was clearly a 
proper class action and that the matter 
had not been questioned. 271 Cal. 
App.2d 252, 272, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781, 
794 (1969). 
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sets, or fraud.,,13 Citing, inter alia, Brown v. Halbert/4 the 
Court stated: "Any use to which [majority shareholders] put 
the corporation or their power to control the corporation 
must benefit all shareholders proportionately and must not 
conflict with the proper conduct of the corporation's busi-
ness.,,15 
The Court reviewed earlier California cases and concluded 
that "[t]he rule that has developed in California is a compre-
hensIve rule of 'inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the 
corporation and those interested therein,' "16 and held that 
this rule applies to officers, directors, and controlling share-
holders in the exercise of powers enjoyed by virtue of their 
position and that it applies to transactions wherein controlling 
shareholders seek an advantage in the transfer or use of their 
controlling stock. The opinion declared that the traditional 
theories of fiduciary obligation as tests of the responsibility 
of majority shareholders to the minority are not adequate, 
particularly in view of the increasing complexity of financial 
transactions. Although the courts have recognized the poten-
tial for abuse or unfair advantage in the sale of control at a 
premium or the sale of control to looters or incompetents, 
no comprehensive rule had emerged in other jurisdictions, and 
most of the commentators had approached the problem from 
the perspective of advantage gained in the sale of control. 
The Court concluded that the case at bench, in which no trans-
fer of actual control was directly involved, demonstrated that 
the injury to the minority anticipated by the commentators 
could be inflicted with impunity under the traditional rules 
and supported the conclusion that "the comprehensive rule 
of good faith and inherent fairness to the minority in any 
transaction where control of the corporation is material"17 is 
applicable to controlling shareholders. 
13. 1 Ca1.3d 93, 108, 81 Cal. Rptr. 16. 1 Cal.3d 93, 110, 81 Cal. Rptr. 
592, 599, 460 P.2d 464, 471 (1969). 592,600,460 P.2d 464, 472 (1969). 
14. 271 Cal. App.2d 252, 76 Cal. 17. 1 Ca1.3d 93, 112, 81 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. 781 (1969). 592, 602, 460 P.2d 464, 474 (1969). 
15. 1 Cal.3d 93, 108, 81 Cal. Rptr. 
592, 599, 460 P.2d 464, 471 (1969). 
CAL. LAW 1970 175 
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The Court then turned to an analysis of the facts, stating 
that in an effort to exploit the investor interest in stock of 
savings and loan associations, defendants, in their controlling 
position, could have created a market for the Association's 
stock, or could have created a holding company and permitted 
all of the Association's shareholders to exchange their shares 
before offering the holding company stock to the public. Un-
der either of these routes, all shareholders would have bene-
fited equally and the minority shareholders would have been 
able to extricate themselves without sacrifice of their invest-
ment if they chose not to remain in the new structure. Thus, 
said the Court, the defendants chose a course of action in which 
they used control of the Association to obtain for themselves 
an advantage not made available to all shareholders, and, 
on the facts alleged, did so without regard to the resulting 
detriment to the minority shareholders and in the absence of 
any compelling business purpose.1S 
The opinion points out that the defendants may present 
evidence at trial tending to show "such good faith or compel-
ling business purpose that would render their action fair 
under the circumstances,,,19 noting that defendants' burden 
would have been much less had they afforded the minority an 
opportunity to exchange their stock on an equal basis or 
offered to purchase the minority stock at a price arrived 
at by independent appraisa1.20 
18. The opinion pointed out that the 
defendants had secured an additional 
advantage for themselves through their 
use of control of the Association when 
they pledged that control of the Associa-
tion's assets and earnings to secure the 
debt of the holding company, a debt 
that had been incurred for their benefit. 
The court expressed concern that any 
decision regarding use of the Associa-
tion's assets and earnings would have to 
be made in the context of the potentially 
conflicting interests of the business 
needs of the Association and the duty 
to the United stockholders. 
176 
19. 1 Ca1.3d 93, 114, 81 Cal. Rptr. 
592, 604, 460 P.2d 464, 476 (1969). 
20. The defendants suggested that 
their transfer to United of related in-
surance businesses and the subsequent 
acquisition of another savings and loan 
association by United were necessary 
to the creation of the market for 
United shares. "Whether defendants 
could have created a market for a 
holding company that controlled a 
single association or reasonably be-
lieved that they could not, goes to their 
good faith and to the existence of a 
proper business purpose for electing 
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Turning to the question of damages, l the opinion noted 
that the transactions in question had resulted in a substantial 
change in the position of the minority shareholders since 
control of the Association had been transferred to a publicly 
held corporation; thereafter the business goals of the Asso-
ciation could be expected to reflect the interests of the holding 
company rather than the aims of the Association's share-
holders. The Court noted that the more familiar fundamental 
corporate changes-merger, consolidation and dissolution-
are accompanied by statutory and judicial safeguards for 
minority shareholders. 
Finding the exchange of stock an integral part of a scheme 
that the defendants could reasonably have foreseen would 
have, as an incidental effect, the destruction of a potential 
public market for Association stock, the Court reasoned that 
receipt of an appraised value reflecting only book value and 
earnings would not compensate the minority shareholders 
for loss of the opportunity to realize a profit from the in-
tangible characteristics that attach to publicly traded stock 
and enhance its value above book value. Therefore, held the 
Court, if plaintiff, after trial, establishes facts in conformity 
with the allegations of the complaint and the stipulated facts, 
then, upon tender of the Association stock to defendants, plain-
tiff would be entitled to receive for each share tendered, at 
her election, either (1) the appraised value of such shares 
as of the date of the exchange, together with interest at 7% 
per annum from the commencement of suit, or (2) a sum 
equivalent to the fair market value, on the date of the com-
mencement of suit, of the United securities received for each 
share of Association stock, together with interest thereon 
from the date of the commencement of suit, and the sum of 
the course that they chose to follow. 
At the trial of the cause defendants 
can introduce evidence relevant to the 
necessity for inclusion of other busi-
nesses." 1 Cal.3d 93, 114, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 592, 603-604, 460 P.2d 464, 475-
476 (1969). 
CAL LAW 1970 
1. The defendants (in their Petition 
for Rehearing or Modification of Opin-
ion, pp. 3-8) urged that the discussion 
of remedies be deleted from the opin-
ion so as to allow the trial court in 
the first instance to fashion an ap-
propriate remedy based upon the evi-
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$927.50 (the return of capital received by the original United 
stockholders), with interest thereon from the date of such 
return of capital. 2 This remedy, fashioned by the Court in 
reviewing a judgment after demurrer, appears to be based 
on the assumption that the marketing scheme could have been 
carried out (either directly in the Association stock or through 
the use of United) had all the minority shareholders been taken 
along at the outset. In the typical case involving sale of the 
controlling stock interest at a premium, the extent of the 
premium would be established as of the time of sale. The 
Court's second alternative, on the other hand, provides for 
valuation at a substantially later date, the date plaintiff com-
mences suit.s Presumably the controlling shareholder can 
prevent market speculation by the minority by making or 
procuring a reasonable (e.g., independent appraisal) offer for 
the minority stock which would, in the event of subsequent 
suit, put a ceiling on recovery. 
Finally, the Court dealt also with the contention that a 
cause of action had been stated as to restraint of trade in 
violation of the Cartwright Act, 4 holding that, assuming argu-
endo that the Cartwright Act applies to transactions in corpo-
rate shares, the complaint was insufficient in that it did not 
allege a purpose to restrain trade or an agreement among de-
fendants not to purchase shares of Association stock from the 
minority. 
The language of Brown and Jones is far broader 
than is necessitated by the facts,S and the practitioner faces 
2. An example of the valuation 
problems presented in the sale-at-a-
premium cases is found in the case of 
Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 
50 A.L.R.2d 1134 (2d Cir., 1955), cert. 
denied, 349 U.S. 952, 99 L.Ed. 1277,75 
S.Ct. 880 (1955), and, particularly, the 
opinion of the lower court on remand, 
154 F.Supp. 436 (1957). 
3. The appraisal remedy given to 
dissenters in the event of a merger 
provides for valuation, under Cal. 
Corps. Code § 4300, as of the "day 
178 
before the vote of the shareholders 
approving the agreement of merger or 
consolidation, excluding any apprecia-
tion or depreciation in consequence of 
the proposed action." 
4. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16720-
16758. 
5. For example, although the Brown 
opinion speaks of a "fiduciary relation-
ship" between Halbert and the minor-
ity, the lones opinion characterizes 
Brown as a "sale of only controlling 
shareholder's shares to purchaser offer-
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substantial problems in dealing with potential applications 
of these cases. Not the least of these difficulties is the poten-
tial conflict-of-Iaws problem lurking in fact situations where 
the seller, purchaser or minority stockholders are domiciled 
outside of California, or the corporate domicile or principal 
place of business is located elsewhere. Because Brown and 
Jones involved California contacts6 almost exclusively, there 
was no need to consider this matter. With these cases the last 
appellate word on the subject, cautious counsel will probably 
have to advise prospective sellers (at least those who are 
actually exercising control or holding corporate office and are 
not merely passive investors) against accepting an offer for 
a 51 % or greater stock interest (and perhaps even an offer 
for a smaller stock interest if it represents, by itself or together 
with stock known to the seller to be then owned by the buyer, 
"working control"), where the offer is arguably at a premium 
price (bearing in mind that this will be determined with the 
benefit of hindsight), unless the offer is accompanied by a 
like offer (or perhaps a commitment to make such an offer 
promptly) to the minority stockholders. Like offer meaning 
the same per share price for all or a similar proportion of their 
ing to buy assets of corporation or all 
shares." 1 Ca1.3d 93, 111, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 592, 601, 460 P.2d 464, 473 
(1969). 
6. United was incorporated under 
Delaware law. The case law on this 
subject in other jurisdictions is far 
from clear. Perlman v. Feldmann, 
219 F.2d 173,50 A.L.R. 1134 (2d Cir., 
1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952, 99 
L.Ed. 1277, 75 S.Ct. 880 (1955), supra, 
decided by the Second Circuit, purport-
edly applying Indiana law, has generally 
been considered the leading case impos-
ing liability on majority stockholders for 
dealing in controlling stock interests. 
In Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 
F.2d 572, 13 A.L.R.3d 346 (2d Cir., 
1962), the court said of Perlman: 
[The] theory was basically 
that the controlling shareholders in 
CAL LAW 1970 
selling control to a potential customer 
had appropriated to their personal 
benefit a corporate asset: the premium 
which the company's product could 
command in a time of market short-
age. (305 F2d 572, 576.) 
Furthermore, a Delaware Chancellor 
said the following about Perlmall 
in Manacher v. Reynolds, 39 Del. Ch. 
401, 165 A.2d 741, 751 (1960): 
As to the Perlman case, which made 
such an impact on the legal fraternity, 
I think it may be distinguished on the 
ground that its shares were sold to a 
buyer with predictable resultant sacri-
fice in the corporation's good will. If 
this distinction lacks substance, I can 
only express a preference for the dis-
sent's view that the increment in stock 
value arising from control belongs to 
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holdings.7 At the very least, the seller may have an obligation 
to notify the minority of the existence of the offer. 8 The scope 
of the seller's "fiduciary" obligation remains to be determined. 
While the foregoing advice to the seller may protect him from 
a lawsuit, it certainly casts on the buyer burdens not previously 
thought to exist. 9 Whether it is now (or ever was) true that 
the buyer has an absolute right to buy as cheaply as possible, 
it should be borne in mind that the buyer becomes the domi-
nant shareholder, subject to the "duty of fairness," as soon as 
his purchase is consummated. It is arguable that this duty 
devolves upon him even before the transaction is completed. 
In summary, while the results of the Jones and Brown cases 
were predictable, many unanswered questions remain. 
I say this because I am satisfied that 
a practical decision of this issue has 
been in existence in the business com-
munity for too many years for a court 
to upset it. 
7. According to Professor Andrew~: 
[W]henever a controlling stock-
holder sells his shares, every other 
holder of shares (of the same class) is 
entitled to have an equal opportunity 
to sell his shares or a pro rata part 
of them on substantially the same 
terms. Or in terms of the correlative 
duty: before a controlling stockholder 
may sell his shares to an outsider he 
must assure his fellow stockholders an 
equal opportunity to sell their shares, 
or as high a proportion of theirs as 
he ultimately sells of his own. 
. . . First, it neither compels nor 
prohibits a sale of stock at any par-
ticular price; it leaves a controlling 
stockholder wholly free to decide for 
himself the price above which he will 
sell and below which he will hold his 
shares. The rule only says that in 
executing his decision to sell, a con-
180 
\.... 
trolling stockholder cannot sell pur-
suant to a purchase offer more favor-
able than any available to other stock-
holders. Second, the rule does not 
compel a prospective purchaser to 
make an open offer for all shares on 
the same terms. He can offer to pur-
chase shares on the condition that he 
gets a certain proportion of the total. 
Or he can even make an offer to pur-
chase 51 per cent of the shares, no 
more and no less. The only require-
ment is that his offer, whatever it may 
be, be made equally or proportionately 
available to all stockholders. 
Andrews, supra, at 515-516. 
8. In the Jones case, the defendants 
asserted that they had made full dis-
closure of all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the formation of United. 
9. For example, buyers attempting 
to reach all of the minority share-
holders may have to comply with the 
Williams Bill. (Pub. Law No. 90-439, 
adding sections 13(d) and (e) and 14 
(d), (e) and (f) to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.) 
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III. 1969 Amendments to the California Corporations Code 
A. Corporate Information Filings 
The most notable of the 1969 legislative changes in the 
California Corporations Code was the amendment of section 
3301,1° and the addition of sections 3301.1-3, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1971.11 The new provisions require more frequent and 
expanded corporate information filings with the Secretary of 
State, and impose the drastic sanction of suspension for failure 
to comply. Section 3301 requires that every domestic corpo-
ration organized after January 1, 1971, file with the Secretary 
of State, within 90 days after the filing of its articles, a state-
ment of the names and complete business or residence ad-
dresses of its president, vice president, secretary and treasurer. 
Furthermore, beginning in 1971, every domestic corporation 
(except new corporations which file within 90 days after 
formation) must file such a statement annually during the 
period between April 1 and June 30.12 Such filings are to 
be made on a form to be prescribed by the Secretary of State, 
together with a filing fee of not more than three dollars.ls 
A copy of any filed statement can be obtained for a one-dollar 
fee. A corporation is also required to attach a statement of 
the names and addresses of its current officers when notifying 
the Secretary of State of a change in the location or address 
of the corporation's principal office, or in the stated address 
of its designated agent. Section 3301 was also amended to 
permit the revocation of a designation of an agent for service 
of process without a simultaneous designation of a new agent. 
Finally, new section 3301.3 authorizes the destruction by 
the Secretary of State of any statement filed under section 
3301, when it has been superseded by the filing of a new 
statement. 
10. Unless otherwise indicated, all 
references in this segment of the 
article to code sections refer to sec-
tions of the California Corporations 
Code. 
11. Stats. 1969, Ch. 1159. 
filing a statement of the location and 
address of the corporation's principal 
office was retained. 
13. A $5 filing fee is set for a com-
bined officer's statement, principal office 
statement, and designation of agent for 
12. The existing requirement for service. 
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It is the sanction attached to the failure to comply with 
the filing requirements that makes these amendments so im-
portant. Formerly, the statute prescribed no penalty for 
failure to file. New section 3301.1 requires that the Secre-
tary of State shall, "as soon as practicable," suspend an offend-
ing corporation's powers, rights and privileges and notify the 
corporation (at the last address disclosed in the records of 
the Secretary of State) and the Franchise Tax Board thereof.14 
One consequence of such suspension would be the risk that 
the corporate name might be appropriated by another person 
during the suspension. Section 3301.2 provides a procedure 
for obtaining relief from suspension by applying to the Secre-
tary of State on a prescribed form, filing the required informa-
tion and paying the filing fee. 15 
B. Reservation of Corporate Names 
Another important change amends section 310 to extend 
the effective period of certificates of reservation of a corporate 
name from 30 to 60 days; concurrently, Government Code 
section 12199 was amended to increase the fee for issuing 
such certificates to $4.00. 
C. Accounting Treatment of· Certain Transactions 
Several changes were made16 with regard to methods of 
accounting for capital items. These changes vest the board 
of directors with greater discretion in determining the account-
ing treatment of various transactions. The board may now 
allocate to paid-in surplus a portion of the consideration re-
14. The Secertary of State's office 
has announced it will give advance 
notice of the filing requirements to 
the domestic corporations for which it 
has addresses. Commencing in 1971, 
each person submitting articles for 
filing will receive a copy of the state-
ment form. As to the annual filing 
requirement, the Secretary of State's 
office plans to mail a copy of the 
required form to each corporation 
early in March of each year. This 
182 
'should help to prevent suspensions 
arising out of inadvertent failures to 
comply with the new requirements. 
Reports, State Bar of California, vol. 
10, no. 1, p. 2 (Jan., 1970). 
15. Such application may be made 
by any shareholder or creditor or by 
a majority of the surviving directors 
or trustees of the corporation. 
16. Stats. 1969, Ch. 481, amending 
§§ 1900, 1901, 3905 and 4117. 
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ceived for no-par stock (without regard to liquidation prefer-
ence); heretofore all such consideration was required to be 
credited to stated capital.17 Surplus on the books of a corpo-
ration acquired by purchase (section 3905) or by merger or 
consolidation (section 4117) may now, to the extent not 
capitalized by the issue of shares or otherwise, be entered 
as earned or paid-in surplus, if to do so would be "in accord-
ance with generally accepted accounting principles."18 Final-
ly, excess consideration received from the issuance of par 
value shares may now, upon a sale of the corporation's assets, 
or upon a merger or a consolidation, be entered as either 
earned or paid-in surplus, in accordance with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles. 
D. Treasury Shares 
When a corporation acquires its own shares in connection 
with a merger or consolidation or a distribution of another 
corporation's assets, section 1709 requires that those shares 
either be carried as treasury shares or retired. This section 
was amended to specify that this rule applies whether the 
other corporation involved is domestic or foreign. 
E. Plan of Arrangement 
Section 4400 authorizes various fundamental changes in 
the operation or structure of a corporation without director 
or shareholder approval, if the changes are carried out pur-
suant to a reorganization under federal law confirmed by an 
order of a federal court. The scope of sections 310, 4400, 
4403 and 4404, was expanded19 to include actions carried 
out pursuant to a plan of arrangement authorized under fed-
eral law, under the same conditions as those specified for 
reorganizations.20 Authority so granted may be exercised by 
17. This could be of consequence 
since dividends may be paid and stock 
may be redeemed out of paid-in sur-
plus. (See §§ 1500, 1706.) 
18. This standard is in contrast to 
the previous standard of "sound ac-
counting practice." 
CAL LAW 1970 
19. Stats. 1969, Ch. 322. 
20. Section 4401 enumerates the 
types of reorgal1izations for which 
§ 4400 authority is available; there is 
no similar provision limiting the 
eligible types of arrangements, and 
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or under the supervision of a trustee, receiver, or committee 
of creditors. 
F. Miscellaneous 
Finally, several minor changes were adopted, including the 
following: New section 3632.51 provides an additional meth-
od for amending the articles of incorporation of a nonstock 
corporation.2 If the bylaws so provide, the articles may now 
be amended by the vote or written consent of two-thirds of a 
policy-making committee created by and composed solely of 
members of the corporation.3 A.B. 1096 codified various 
provisions presently found in the state Constitution, which 
are omitted from the proposed revised Constitution. New 
section 129 states: "No corporation, association or individual 
shall issue or put in circulation, as money, anything but the 
lawful money of the United States." 
IV. 1969 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation 
Law 
The 1969 amendments to the Delaware General Corpora-
tion Law affected some thirty sections.4 Since that statute 
had undergone extensive revision in 1967, many of the 1969 
approved by a federal court under a 
federal statute will qualify. 
1. Stats. 1969, Ch. 396. 
2. Other methods are set forth in 
§ 3632. 
3. Section 3672, dealing with the cer-
tificate of amendment to be filed with 
the Secretary of State, was amended to 
conform with this new provision. 
4. House Bill No. 270, Laws of 
1969, approved June 23, 1969, and 
effective July 15, 1969, amended sec-
tions 102, 103, 122, 126, 141, 144, 151, 
153, 155, 212, 213, 214, 218, 224, 228, 
229, 242, 251, 252, 253, 256, 258, 262, 
271, 275, 311, 344, 371 and 379 of the 
General Corporation Law. House Bill 
No. 290, Laws of 1969, approved and 
184 
effective June 23, 1969, amended sec-
tion 243. House Bill No. 252, Laws of 
1969, approved June 23, 1969, and effec-
tive July 15, 1969, amended sections 
371 and 391 to increase certain filing 
fees. The same bill also increased, by 
10%, the Delaware annual franchise 
tax and raised the minimum tax from 
$10 to $20 and the maximum from 
$100,000 to $110,000. Also, the an-
nual report filing fee was increased to 
$10 for domestic corporations and to 
$30 for foreign corporations. 
Unless otherwise indicated, all refer-
ences in this segment of the article 
to code sections refer to sections of 
the Delaware General Corporation 
Law. 
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changes were of a housekeeping nature. It is the purpose of 
this segment of the article to call attention to the more im-
portant changes, particularly those of a substantive nature, key-
ing (by footnote citation) the amendments discussed to the 
parallel California statutory provisions. The amendments 
are discussed under four headings: "Corporate Finance Mat-
ters;" "Corporate Management Matters"; "Stockholders Mat-
ters"; and "Miscellaneous". The general thrust of the amend-
ments is to enhance the attractiveness of the Delaware 
corporation as an intrepreneurial tool by facilitating corpo-
rate activity and increasing the power and flexibility of cor-
porate management. 5 
A. Corporate Finance Matters 
1. Merger, Consolidation and Sale of Assets 
Two of the most important changes made in 1969 were 
in the area of merger, consolidation and sale of assets. First, 
the requirement for stockholder approval of a merger or con-
solidation was reduced from two-thirds of the total number 
of the outstanding shares of capital stock to "a majority of 
the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote 
thereon."6 This is not merely a reduction from two-thirds 
to a majority; the amendment also makes it possible to de-
prive a stockholder of the right to vote on this issue. Whether 
stock is entitled to vote on a merger is determined by the 
certificate of incorporation.7 The provision for stockholder 
5. For other discussions of the sub-
ject matter of this segment of the 
article see Folk, Amendments to the 
Delaware General Corporation Law 
and Technical Amendments Act (Cor-
poration Service Company, 1969), and 
Arsht and Stapleton, A nalysis of the 
1969 Amendments to the Delaware 
Corporation Law (Prentice-Hall Cor-
poration Law Service 347). 
6. Del. Corp. Law § 251. Unless 
the articles require a greater percent-
age, Cal. Corps. Code § 4) 07 requires 
CAL LAW 1970 
approval of "not less than two-thirds 
of the issued and outstanding shares 
of each class, regardless of limitations 
or restrictions on the voting power 
thereof, entitled to vote at a meet-
ing. . . ." 
7. This amendment, when read in 
conjunction with Del. Corp. Law § 212, 
as amended, authorizes the granting to 
a particular class or series of stock of 
a weighted vote in connection with a 
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approval of a sale of all or substantially all of the corporation's 
assets was amended to make its language identical to that of 
the amended merger provisions. 8 
SecoI).d, the permissible forms of consideration which may 
be given to effect a merger have been enlarged; now "prop-
erty" and "rights" may be utilized, as well as cash and secu-
rities. The statute expressly authorizes the conversion or 
exchange of shares of a constituent corporation into or for 
"cash, property, rights or securities of any other corporation," 
as well as shares of the surviving or resulting corporation.9 
Thus, the merger agreement may now provide for the con-
version of shares into a right to receive shares of the result-
ing or surviving corporation, or a parent thereof (the so-
called triangular merger), in the future upon the happening 
of specified events, even if that right is not evidenced by a 
"security." Parallel changes have been made in the provisions 
permitting the merger of Delaware and non-Delaware corpo-
rations and the provisions concerning short-form mergers be-
tween parent and subsidiary.lO 
By virtue of the 1967 general revision, a merger could 
be consummated without stockholder approval where the 
surviving corporation did not amend its charter or issue or 
deliver shares (authorized and unissued or treasury shares) 
of any class of its stock in excess of 15 percent of the number 
of shares of that class outstanding immediately prior to the 
merger. The 1969 amendment continues this exemption 
from stockholder approval, but requires that there be executed 
and filed a certificate reciting the facts which excuse stock-
8. Del. Corp. Law § 271 (a); the 
former language called for "the affir-
mative vote of the holders of a major-
ity of the stock issued and outstanding 
having voting power at a stockholders' 
meeting." Cal. Corps. Code § 3901 
requires approval of "a majority of 
the voting power of the corporation," 
unless the articles impose a more 
stringent approval requirement. 
9. Del. Corp. Law §§ 251, 252: 
compare Cal. Corps. Code § 4103 
186 
("cash, property, or securities, in whole 
or in part, in lieu of shares [of the 
consolidated or surviving corporation]. 
. . .") 
10. Del. Corp. Law §§ 252, 253; 
compare Cal. Corps. Code §§ 4118 
(merger or consolidation of California 
and foreign corporation), 4124 (short-
form merger of California corporation 
and California or foreign wholly-
owned subsidiary). 
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holder approval. The amendment further provides that such 
filing constitutes a representation that the facts remain true 
immediately prior to the filing.l1 
A requirement that an agreement governing the merger of 
Delaware corporations set forth the provisions or facts re-
quired or permitted under Delaware law to be stated in the 
charter was deleted. The substitute provision requires that the 
merger agreement state such amendments in the charter of 
the surviving corporation as are desired to be effected by the 
merger or consolidation, or if no such amendments are desired, 
a statement that the charter of one of the constituents shall 
be the charter of the surviving or resulting corporation.12 
Finally, several language changes were made in the provi-
sions governing the merger or consolidation of foreign and 
Delaware corporations.13 Previously, the statute authorized 
such a merger if the foreign jurisdiction was one "which per-
mit (s) such merger or consolidation." It was unclear wheth-
er this clause required that the foreign law authorize the 
particular form of merger authorized in Delaware, or merely 
that the foreign law authorize generally a merger between 
domestic and foreign corporations. 14 The statutory lan-
guage was amended to make clear that the latter interpreta-
tion was correct. Therefore, a Delaware corporation may 
utilize the short-form procedure even though the domicile 
of the foreign corporation with which it is merging does not 
authorize such short-form mergers. Of course, the foreign 
corporation must still comply with the requirements of the 
law of its domicile. 15 
2. Appraisal Rights 
In Delaware, appraisal rights are given only to dissenters 
from proposed mergers and consolidations.16 Even as to 
11. Del. Corp. Law § 251(f). 
12. Del. Corp. Law § 251(b). 
13. Del. Corp. Law §§ 252, 253, 
256 and 258. 
14. This question arose particularly 
in the context of short-form mergers 
pursuant to Del. Corp. Law § 253. 
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15. Compare Cal. Corps. Code 
§ 4118, dealing with mergers and con-
solidations of California and foreign 
corporations. 
16. This is true in California as 
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these, Section 262 (k) heretofore denied (in the absence 
of a contrary charter provision) appraisal rights with respect 
to any class or series of shares registered on a national secu-
rities exchange or held of record by not less than 2,000 stock-
holders. Appraisal rights were also denied to stockholders 
of a surviving corporation if, by virtue of section 251 (f), 
a vote of the stockholders of the surviving corporation was 
not required. Appraisal rights were withheld from these two 
categories, however, only if the plan provided for the stock-
holders to receive only stock of the resulting or surviving 
corporation or stock and cash in lieu of fractional shares. 
So-called triangular mergers have become quite common, 
and the effect of this provision was to deny appraisal rights 
to the stockholders of a publicly held company who received 
stock of the resulting or surviving corporation, but to confer 
such rights upon stockholders of such a corporation who re-
ceived shares of a parent of the resulting or surviving corpo-
ration. Section 262 (k) now denies the appraisal remedy 
if the stockholders receive stock of "any other corporation" 
so long as the stock they are to receive is either registered 
on a national securities exchange or is held of record by not 
less thn 2,000 stockholders. Thus, the appraisal right is now 
avoidable in the common situation where the stockholders of 
a constituent corporation receive the stock of the parent of 
the resulting or surviving corporation.17 
On the other hand, section 262 (b) was amended18 to pro-
vide the appraisal remedy to stockholders who "were not 
entitled to vote" on the merger or consolidation and who filed 
written objection thereto before the taking of the vote. 19 Also, 
section 262 was further amended to preserve the appraisal 
right, where the merger or consolidation is approved by 
17. Provided that the stock received 
is either registered on a national securi-
ties exchange or is held of record by 
not less than 2,000 shareholders. 
18. This change was necessitated by 
the amendment to Del. Corp. Law 
§ 251 (c), di5cussed above in connection 
with mergers and consolidations. 
188 
19. Under the amended merger 
provisions, notice of the stockholders' 
meeting called to vote upon a merger 
must be sent to all stockholders 
whether or not they are entitled to 
vote on the merger. Del. Corp. Law 
§ 251(c). 
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written consent rather than at a stockholders' meeting, for 
those stockholders who either did not, or had no right to, 
consent thereto. 
3. Consideration for Shares 
Section 153 was amended to delete the requirement that 
consideration for shares be expressed in dollars.20 
4. Convertible Securities 
By greatly expanding the types of permissible convertible 
securities, the amendment to section 151 (e) increased flexi-
bility in corporate finance matters. Stock of any class or 
series may now be made convertible into or exchangeable for 
stock of any other class or series; convertibility had previously 
been limited to "preferred or special stock." Thus, there is 
now explicit authorization for convertible common stock and 
for the convertibility of shares of any series into another series 
of the same class. Furthermore, the statute now explicitly 
states that such conversion or exchange may be (1) at the 
option of the corporation, or (2) at the option of the holder of 
the security, or (3) upon the happening of a specified event.1 
5. Fractional Shares 
The 1969 amendments also increased flexibility in in-
stances when a corporation elects not to issue fractional shares. 
Previously, the corporation had either (1) to pay in cash the 
fair value of fractional shares as of the time of the determina-
tion of persons entitled to receive them, or (2) to issue scrip 
or warrants entitling the holder to receive a certificate for 
a full share upon surrender of scrip or warrants aggregating 
a full share. Section 155 now permits the corporation, as a 
third alternative, to "arrange for the disposition of fractional 
interests by those entitled thereto." Further, the amendments 
20. Compare Cal. Corps. Code tary terms" of the non-money considera-
§ 1112, requiring the board to "state tion for shares. 
by resolution its determination of the 1. Compare Cal. Corps. Code §§ 
fair value to the corporation in mone- 1100, 1103 and 1104. 
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specified the rights (voting, receipt of dividends, and par-
ticipation in liquidation distributions) which are enjoyed by 
holders of fractional shares, but not by scrip or warrant 
holders absent specific provision therefor. 2 
B. Corporate Management Matters 
Delaware law has long provided that a corporation may, 
by charter provision, deviate from the norm of management 
of its business by the board of directors.s It was thereby in-
tended to permit owners to establish whatever managerial 
structure best suited a particular enterprise. Nevertheless, 
questions persisted as to the scope of the authorization to 
situate ultimate managerial power elsewhere than in the 
board, and as to the relationship between section 141 (a), and 
statutory provisions expressly calling for action by directors. 
Section 141 (a) now provides that where in allocation of 
such powers diverges from the norm, all powers and duties 
usually conferred or imposed upon the board "shall be exer-
cised or performed to such extent and by such person or per-
sons" as the charter provides. 
In addition to the powers granted in the charter and else-
where in the statute, Delaware corporations have the powers 
specified in section 122. Prior to the 1969 amendments, 
Delaware corporations were empowered, in time of war or 
other national emergency, notwithstanding charter restric-
tions, to do any lawful business in aid thereof at the request 
or direction of any apparently authorized governmental au-
thority. Section 122(12) was amended to empower the 
corporation to "transact any lawful business which the cor-
poration's board of directors shall find to be in aid of gov-
ernmental authority." This removes the limitation to emer-
2. Compare Cal. Corps. Code § 2215 
(articles or by-laws may deprive frac-
tional shares of voting rights). 
3. Del. Corp. Law § 141(a); com-
pare Cal. Corps. Code § 800, which 
provides: "Subject to limitations of 
the articles and of this division as to 
190 
action which shall be authorized or 
approved by the shareholders, all cor· 
porate powers shall be exercised by or 
under authority of, and the business 
and affairs of every corporation shall 
be controlled by [the board of direc-
tors]." 
CAL LAW 1970 
26
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/7
Corporations 
gency conditions and shifts the focus to the board's finding 
of facts and exercise of business judgment. 
The board may now consist of a single member. 4 The stat-
ute previously had set a minimum of three, unless all shares 
were owned beneficially and of record by fewer than three 
persons, in which event the number of directors could be 
equal to or greater than the number of stockholders. An-
other amendment to section 141 (b) clarified existing law 
by explicitly stating that the number of directors may be fixed 
by either the charter or the by-Iaws.s Section 141 (b) was 
also amended to delete the numerical minimum with regard 
to a quorum of directors (formerly two directors, except in 
the case of a one-man board); the fractional minimum of 1/3, 
however, has been retained. Thus, the statute now provides 
that a majority of the board constitutes a quorum unless a 
greater number is required by the charter or by-laws and, 
unless the charter otherwise provides, the by-laws may pro-
vide for a smaller quorum so long as it is not less than 1/3 
of the entire board, e.g., one director when the board consists 
of three or fewer directors.6 
Amendments to section 229 and the addition of section 
141 (i) have facilitated the conduct of board meetings and 
dispensed with unnecessary formalities. Attendance at a 
meeting of the board or any committee now operates as a 
waiver of notice of that meeting, and where a written waiver 
of notice is utilized the waiver need not recite the purpose 
of the meeting.7 These provisions previously applied only 
4. Del. Corp. Law § 141(b); Cal. 
Corps. Code § 800 requires a board of 
not less than three directors. 
5. Compare Cal. Corps. Code §§ 301 
(d) and 501(d), permitting the articles or 
by-laws to provide for an indefinite 
number of directors (not less than a 
stated minimum of five or more), and 
permitting the number of directors to 
be changed by amendment of the 
articles or, unless the articles provide 
otherwise, amendment of the by-laws. 
6. Compare Cal. Corps. Code § 816, 
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which provides as follows: "A major-
ity of the authorized number of direc-
tors constitutes a quorum of the board 
for the transaction of business unless 
the articles or by-laws provide that a 
different number, which in no case 
shall be less than one-third the 
authorized number of directors, nor 
less than two, constitutes a quorum." 
7. Compare Cal. Corps. Code § 814, 
which provides in part as follows: 
"The transactions of any meeting of 
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to stockholder meetings. Furthermore, a member of the 
board or of a committee is deemed present in person at a 
meeting if, by virtue of a conference telephone call or similar 
communications arrangement, all persons participating in the 
meeting can hear each other. The applicability of this provi-
sion can be negated by a provision in the charter or by-laws. 
Section 141 (c) previously contained a sweeping author-
ization which, read literally, empowered committees of the 
board of directors to exercise all powers of the board to the 
extent that they were delegated in the by-laws or in the resolu-
tion creating the committee. The 1969 amendments more 
specifically defined the scope of the power that may be dele-
gated. This eliminated the possibility that there might be 
certain "fundamental" or "extraordinary" powers which are 
nondelegable. The statute now authorizes any committee, to 
the extent provided in the by-laws or in the board resolution 
creating the committee, to exercise all of the power and au-
thority of the board, subject to two classes of exceptions. 
First, no committee may exercise the board's power with 
respect to amending the charter, adopting an agreement of 
merger or consolidation, recommending to stockholders the 
transfer of all or substantially all of the corporation's prop-
erty, recommending to stockholders a dissolution or the revo-
cation of a dissolution, or amending the by-laws. Second, a 
committee may declare dividends or authorize the issuance of 
stock only pursuant to an express delegation of these powers in 
the charter, by-laws or resolution creating the committee.s 
Another amendment to section 141 (c) reduced the minimum 
and noticed or wherever held, are as 
valid as though had at a meeting duly 
held after regular call and notice, if 
a quorum is present and if, either 
before or after the meeting, each of 
the directors not present signs a writ-
ten waiver of notice, a consent to 
holding the meeting, or an approval 
of the minutes thereof." 
8. Compare Cal. Corps. Code § 822, 
which provides in part as follows: 
192 
"The by-laws may provide for the ap-
pointment by the board of directors 
of an executive committee and other 
committees and may authorize the 
board to delegate to the executive 
committee any of the powers and 
authority of the board in the manage-
ment of the business and affairs of the 
corporation, except the power to de-
clare dividends and to adopt, amend 
or repeal by-laws." 
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size of a committee of the board from two directors to 
one.9 
The board is now expressly authorized to fix the compensa-
tion of directors, absent a restriction in the charter or by-Iaws.10 
In the area of transactions involving common or interested 
directors or officers, the validation provisions were expanded 
so that a transaction which would otherwise be tainted is 
now validated if approved by the affirmative votes of a major-
ity of the disinterested directors, even though the disinterested 
directors comprise less than a quorum. ll Previously, approval 
was required by a vote sufficient for such purpose without 
counting the vote of interested directors. Furthermore, other 
amendments to section 144 make it clear that the entire sec-
tion is applicable to both the common and the interested 
director situation. 
The statute broadly authorizes corporations to keep their 
records (including stock ledgers, books of account, and min-
ute books) 12 on any convenient information storage device, in-
cluding devices utilized with computers, Section 224 was 
amended to provide that a "clearly legible written form pro-
duced" from the original record-keeping mechanism is admis-
sible in evidence and shall be accepted for all other purposes 
to the same extent an original written record would have been, 
"when said written form accurately portrays the record." The 
statute had previously specified that the original form (e.g., 
cards, tapes, microphotographs, etc.) would be admissible. 
9. The executive committee of a 
California corporation must be com· 
posed of two or more directors. Cal. 
Corps. Code § 822. 
10. Compare Cal. Corps. Code § 501 
(d), providing that the by·laws may 
make provision, not in conflict with 
law or the articles, for the compensa-
tion of directors. 
11. Del. Corp. Law § 144; compare 
Cal. Corps. Code § 820, permitting 
common or interested directors to be 
counted in determining the presence 
of a quorum, but requiring action by 
a vote sufficient for the purpose with· 
CAL LAW 1970 
out counting the votes of such direc· 
tors. 
12. Compare Cal. Corps. Code §§ 
3000-3004; in 1963, Cal. Corps. Code 
§ 3002 was amended to permit the 
keeping of information required in the 
share register on "punchcards, magnet· 
ic tape, or other information storage 
device related to electronic data proc· 
essing equipment provided that such 
card, tape, or other equipment is ca· 
pable of reproducing the information 
in clearly legible form for the purposes 
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C. Stockholder Matters 
Stockholder action by non unanimous written consent was 
originally validated in the 1967 Delaware Code revision. This 
is in sharp contrast with the majority of other jurisdictions 
where stockholder action by written consent is permitted only 
if unanimous. 13 Now, Delaware has gone even further to 
facilitate stockholder action by written consent. An amend-
ment to section 228 authorizes such nonunanimous written 
consent (i.e., consent by the holders of stock having not less 
than the minimum number of votes that would be necessary 
to take such action at a meeting at which all shares entitled 
to vote thereon were present and voted) unless the charter pro-
vides otherwise. Previously, such action was permitted only 
if the charter affirmatively authorized it. Furthermore, notice 
of action by nonunanimous written consent need be given 
only to the nonconsenting stockholders. If action so taken 
results in a document required to be filed with the Secretary 
of State, such filing must contain appropriate recitals that 
the action was taken in conformity with the statute, and that 
written notice has been given to nonconsenting stockholders. 
A related provision14 specifies that the record date for ex-
pressing stockholder action by written consent is the day when 
the first consent is given, unless a record date is formally set 
under the statutory procedure therefor. 
Several of the 1969 amendments directly concerned voting 
rights. With regard to cumulative voting, Delaware,15 unlike 
California/6 continues to make cumulative voting permissive 
rather than mandatory. Section 214 has been amended to 
make it clear that a charter provision conferring cumulative 
voting rights may specify that such privilege will be enjoyed 
by one or more classes or series within classes. Previously, 
the statute spoke only of "each holder of stock." This section 
was also amended to make clear that a stockholder having 
13. Compare, e.g., Cal. Corps. Code 
§ 2239. 
14. Del. Corp. Law § 213; compare 
Cal. Corps. Code §§ 2214, 2215. 
194 
15. Del. Corp. Law § 214. 
16. Cal. Corps. Code § 2235. 
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cumulative voting rights is entitled to the number of votes 
he would otherwise have, multiplied by the number of direc-
tors to be elected by him. The prior language, when read 
literally, did not fit the situation where a class that enjoyed 
cumulative voting rights was entitled to elect only part of 
the board. 
Another amendment in this area concerned fractional and 
multiple voting. Before the 1969 amendments, a charter 
provision prescribing a deviation from the one-share-one-vote 
norm, at least as to election of directors, was permitted. l7 
It was not clear whether fractional or multiple voting was 
permissible as to other matters. Section 212(a) has been 
amended to provide that where the charter prescribes more 
or less than one vote for any share on any matter, all statutory 
references to "a majority or other proportion of stock shall 
refer to such majority or other proportion of the votes of 
such stock." 
Section 275, which sets forth the procedure for dissolution, 
now provides that a proposed dissolution requires the approval 
of a majority of the outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon; 
heretofore, the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the voting 
stock was required. ls Section 311, pertaining to the revoca-
tion of a voluntary dissolution, was amended to conform by 
permitting such revocation by the vote of a majority of the 
stock which was outstanding and entitled to vote on a dissolu-
tion at the time of dissolution. l9 Furthermore, a new provi-
sion20 authorizes dissolution, without meetings of directors 
or stockholders, upon the written consent of all stockholders 
entitled to vote on a dissolution. 
Section 242 was amended to provide that if a proposed 
charter amendment would adversely affect less than all of the 
17. Del. Corp. Law § 212; compare 
Cal. Corps. Code § 2215, which pro-
vides in part: "In the absence of any 
contrary provision in the articles or 
in any statute relating to the election 
of directors or to other particular mat-
ters, each [ record shareholder] is en-
titled to one vote for each share." 
CAL. L.AW 1970 
18. Compare Cal. Corps. Code 
§ 4600 (vote or written consent of "50 
percent or more" of the voting power). 
19. Compare Cal. Corps. Code 
§ 4606 (vote or written consent of 
"not less than a majority" of the 
voting power). 
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series within a class of stock, then the class vote required 
to approve such action applies only to the series affected, 
rather than to the class as a whole.1 Thus, affected stock-
holders are no longer lumped together with others who have 
no interest in the action proposed. 
The Delaware statute, as revised in 1967, provided that 
unless extended in the prescribed manner, a voting trust or 
other stockholder voting agreement would be effective for 
a maximum period of 10 years. Section 218 was amended 
in 1969 to specify that the validity of a voting trust is not 
adversely affected during the 10-year period of validity, even 
though by its terms it purports to run beyond 10 years; the 
savings clause previously referred only to voting agreements. 2 
The 1967 revision reversed the pre-existing common law 
preemptive right by providing that in the absence of an 
express charter provision granting preemptive rights, no such 
rights would exist. 3 It was intended that this change would 
operate prospectively without destroying existing preemptive 
rights. The 1969 amendments clarified this savings provi-
sion by expressly declaring that all preemptive rights in exist-
ence on July 3, 1967, the effective date of the 1967 revision, 
remain unaffected by section 102 (b )( 3 ), unless altered by 
appropriate action expressly making such alteration. 
Section 102(b) (3) was also amended to provide that preemp-
tive rights might be granted as to a particular class or series, 
and to provide explicitly that preemptive rights to subscribe 
to a security convertible into a designated class or series do 
not exist unless the charter expressly grants such rights as to 
the convertible security. 
1. Compare Cal. Corps. Code §§ 
3632-3638. 
2. Compare Cal. Corps. Code §§ 
2230 and 2231, validating voting trusts 
for a period not greater than 21 years. 
3. Compare Cal. Corps. Code § 305, 
permitting inclusion in the articles of 
provisions granting "preemptive rights 
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to subscribe to any or all issues of 
shares or securities," and Cal. Corps. 
Code § 1106, which provides as fol-
lows: "Unless the articles provide 
otherwise, the board of directors may 
issue shares, option rights, or securi-
ties having conversion or option rights, 
without first offering them to share-
holders of any class." 
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New section 103(f) validates the eXIstmg administrative 
practice in the office of the Delaware Secretary of State by 
which a corporation may correct a previously filed inaccurate 
or defective instrument. The statute now expressly authorizes 
the filing of a certificate of correction which specifies the 
inaccuracy or defect to be corrected and sets forth the portion 
of the instrument in corrected form. The corrected instrument 
is made retroactively effective as of the date of the filing of 
the original instrument, except for preserving the interests of 
those "substantially and adversely affected by the correction," 
as to whom it is effective as of the filing of the certificate of 
correction. 
The restrictions on name use which have heretofore been 
applicable to businesses incorporated in Delaware have now 
been made applicable to foreign corporations. Section 371 
( c) was amended to prohibit the issuance to a foreign corpo-
ration of a certificate stating that it has filed its charter with 
the Delaware Secretary of State, unless the foreign corpora-
tion's name is such as to distinguish it from the names of cor-
porations organized in Delaware and the names of other 
foreign corporations reserved or registered with the Secretary 
of State (unless the other corporation consents).4 
Not unexpectedly, Section 391 was amended to increase 
various fees to be charged by the Secretary of State. 
Finally, in 1969, the Delaware legislature enacted a Pro-
fessional Service Corporation Act which, generally speak-
ing, permits the incorporation of individuals or groups en-
gaged in licensed professions.5 
The net effect of the 1969 amendments was to make Dela-
4. Compare Cal. Corps. Code § 6404. 
5. Ch. 6, tit. 8, Del. Code, enacted 
by House Bill No. 106, approved and 
effective June 7, 1969. In California, 
the Moscone-Knox Professional Cor-
poration Act, Cal. Corps. Code § § 
13400-13410, which became effective 
November 13, 1968, authorized the 
CAL LAW 1970 
formation of professional corporations 
for the rendering of professional serv-
ices by lawyers, doctors, osteopaths, 
podiatrists and dentists. In 1969, this 
privilege was extended to certified 
psychologists under § 2995 of the 
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ware corporation law an even better tool for corporate man-
agement, and to require even more care than before in the 
drafting of charter and by-law provisions for Delaware cor-
porations. 
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